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classes and milieus to close ranks and form an ”expanded 
middle“ to protect themselves in the crisis.
However, securing an advantage during a crisis demands 
both the ability to learn, and adaptability in crisis manage-
ment. This understanding has led the German government 
to symbolically reduce its tough austerity policies regard-
ing investment programmes, not to mention policies linked 
to the tasks of the European Central Bank (ECB) and those 
aimed at alleviating youth unemployment in Europe. The 
message here is clear: although there will be no major devia-
tions from the basic trend, occasional ”course adjustments“ 
may be required.
Yet the critique the German government levies at its Euro-
pean neighbours is also felt within the country itself. Just as 
the government treats the crisis in other European countries 
as an expression of a lack of willingness to adapt to the con-
straints of globalization, reduced competitiveness and an 
exuberant dependency culture, in Germany too, the govern-
ment assumes that a position at the bottom end of the social 
hierarchy can be blamed on individual misconduct and a lack 
of personal responsibility and motivation.
Accordingly, the German government argues that indi-
vidual failure on the (labour) market is to blame for the prob-
lems faced by the millions of wage-earners who find them-
selves below the poverty line and without any prospect for 
social mobility. The government’s views are the mental con-
sequences of the neoliberal turn that began in the 1980s, the 
The CDU/CSU’s strategy of governing until the summer and then running a short election campaign has been successful. 
Although there are only two months to go until the federal election on 22 September, it would be difficult to claim that the 
country is in election mood, let alone in a mood for change. There is currently far less desire for a change of government than 
before the elections in 2005 and 2009. Despite this, the existing governing coalition of the (conservative) CDU/CSU and the 
(liberal) FDP does not even have the strongest public support of all possible political constellations. In terms of support, the 
current coalition ranks behind a coalition of the (social democratic) SPD and the Greens, and most strongly of all behind a 
coalition of the (governing) CDU and the SPD. Clearly many voters long for a return to the grand coalition of the CDU and 
the SPD. However, this is mainly due to the weakness of the FDP, which is caused by the party’s clientelism and continued 
adherence to neoliberalism; as such, it is not even clear whether the FDP will regain entry into the next parliament. 
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after eigHt years of MerKel:  
no trouble?
tHe PolitiCal CliMate in gerMany in tHe suMMer before tHe eleCtion
Despite the current climate of economic and political turmoil, 
Germany appears both stable and fully capable of learning. 
Above all, this applies to the country’s political, democratic 
and institutional framework – the state. This is clear from the 
flexibility of the German party system and its apparent ability 
to overcome external and internal disruption. Moreover, Ger-
many’s high level of industrialisation, and its flexible orienta-
tion towards European and especially North American and 
Asian export markets has helped keep the country in good 
economic shape.
A corporatist model of crisis management has developed 
around these export-oriented industrial sectors based on 
transnational corporations and their staff, associations and 
unions. Throughout politics, there is talk of a grand coalition 
consisting of the CDU/CSU, the SPD and the Greens, with 
regular reference made to the crisis management under-
taken between 2008 and 2009. During this period, a new 
form of social partnership developed around the key terms 
of ”scrapping premiums“ and ”short work“. These policies 
have successfully steered the German economy through the 
continuing European crisis during the last six years.
The realisation that such a situation will not continue for 
long if a country’s economy shrinks over a period of years 
instead of expanding and servicing its debt; that 25 or even 
50 per cent unemployment among young people cannot 
provide a basis for social stability; and that Germany is in 
a privileged – but fragile – situation has led different social 
2dismantlement of social rights, the switch to private service 
provision and the development of structures providing 
social services. Additionally, the welfare state has been run 
dry, and this is particularly the case in the fields of labour and 
employment. In turn, these developments have led to resig-
nation, which is expressed through declining voter turnout, 
particularly among the lower social classes. Despite this, it 
is essential to remember that, “The political resignation of 
the lower classes protects capitalism from democracy and 
stabilises the neoliberal turn – the actual basis of such res-
ignation.”1
tHe ”big Parties are in Power“  
but tHere are no big issues
For several decades, the legal rights of the real estate, equity, 
capital and property owners to returns on their capital and 
the repayment of securities have been prioritised over social 
rights. At the same time, austerity measures and the export-
orientated economy now connect legal rights to the inter-
ests of the industrial core workforce. Not least since the 
expansion of private pensions, core workers have tended to 
view themselves as the likely benefactors of (future) invest-
ment income, and assume that this will have to be balanced 
in their budgets alongside the interests of wage earners, 
social security claimants and those of people living purely off 
investment income. At the same time, the withdrawal and 
exclusion of the subaltern classes from political participation 
strengthens the socio-political alliance between the middle 
and upper classes. “The people believe that this country has 
been well directed through the eurozone crisis. Many policy 
areas now receive far less criticism [...] The current legislative 
period has been dominated by two remarkably parallel devel-
opments: an upswing in the labour market and the robust 
German economy on the one hand, and the crisis in the euro-
zone on the other.”2 Although there have been numerous dis-
cussions about the measures needed to resolve the crisis, 
the policy debate has not been based around fundamental 
divisions between two opposing political camps; instead the 
discussions have merely focused on ”the details“.3 Clearly, 
there is no room in the debate for a grand political coali-
tion. Moreover, the announcements made by the SPD and 
the Green Party demonstrate that neither party is willing to 
contest the election as part of a new political constellation 
aimed at bringing about fundamental political change.
The lack of contentious issues in the election campaign 
makes the parties “nervous and at the same time at a loss as 
to how they can win over voters”.4 This is because political 
climates without polarizing issues tend to return unpredict-
able election results. According to ZDF’s electoral poll (its 
”political barometer“), people are faced with a number of 
”important“ problems, but none of these issues was defined 
by more than a third of respondents as a ”major problem“.5
The lack of polarization in the election campaign is also 
due to reduced ideological party affiliation and shrinking 
numbers of loyal party voters. At the same time, a growing 
number of issue-related protest movements exist with high 
technological expertise, as the example of the Stuttgart 21 
protests demonstrates. This also makes it more difficult to 
predict people’s voting patterns, and consequently elec-
tion strategies become more uncertain. On the other hand, 
when asked about the problems that ”politics“ should pri-
oritise, the public is still generally concerned about the same 
major issues: the future of the euro, the energy transition, 
state finances, wages and deepening inequality.6 Since none 
of the mainstream parties have made these central to their 
campaigns, the election result will remain exciting until the 
end; in such a climate, voting patterns could be strongly 
affected by both minor and sudden events.
a PolitiCal systeM in Crisis?
The absence of highly important issues in the electoral 
campaign is an expression of crisis in the political system. 
Mainstream political parties are no longer in a position to 
command a majority vote, nor or are they able to provide 
society with consistent manifestos or crisis management 
strategies that the majority support. “Since the beginning 
of the on-going crisis, the political and ideological impera-
tives of rigid neoliberalism have been unable to command 
a majority either within party politics or during elections – 
government policies have led to a stronger move away from 
radical market self-regulation. In principle, this process of 
social-democratisation is making it increasingly difficult 
to distinguish the contours and the profile of the European 
social democratic parties and the left-wing political spectrum 
in general.”7
As of yet, no new political project or ”strong movement 
of the subaltern classes“ has taken the place of the declin-
ing binding force of market ideology. As there is no project 
or movement that could implement an alternative strat-
egy in the crisis, “socio-political developments are moving 
more and more towards technocratic administration [...] 
in this country, this means governance through silence. At 
the same time, as parties and internal party rivals are being 
deprived of power, we are also seeing an increase in cross-
party resolutions.”8
The chancellor’s strength is not derived from her party’s 
manifesto, but from her skilled deployment of power and 
her role as the captain of the ”MS Germany“ which is cur-
rently sailing through dangerous waters. It is the crisis that is 
holding her party – and her power – together. However, this 
leads to the obvious problem of finding coherence among 
the ruling classes.
First, this includes the renaissance of the issue of inequal-
ity, which is caused by the lack of prospects of a positive end 
to the current crisis, and the fact that gains and losses are 
being unfairly distributed with the current form of crisis man-
agement. The abandonment of morally and culturally sanc-
tioned methods of distributing resources, life chances, par-
ticipatory opportunities and securities jeopardises the social 
order: clearly, something is rotten in the state of Germany. It 
would certainly be possible to focus on these issues during 
the next general election; issues that the public generally 
views in terms of justice and security.
With the publication of the ECB’s report on the unequal 
distribution of wealth in Germany and Europe, it is clearly 
time to warn that, “Particularly those parties which call 
themselves ”middle class“ need to think about the distri-
bution of wealth in Germany. Which middle class are they 
referring to? Who are they speaking about when they boast 
about tax payers? Is it really right to complain about the 
supposed ”effortlessly gained wealth“ of people receiv-
ing social welfare while not even mentioning the wealth 
of property owners, which really is effortlessly gained? 
More important, though, is what citizens in the middle of 
society actually do with the things they know. Inequality 
in Germany is the result of a diverse range of political deci-
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sions – very few of which could have been possible without 
their consent.”9
Second, conflicts of interest of unprecedented propor-
tions have developed among the elite and business. The 
confederations representing industry are finding it increas-
ingly difficult to assert their common interests through poli-
tics: politicians now tend to turn to large transnational actors 
without consulting these confederations. Furthermore, 
the sector of small and medium-sized enterprises, which 
has always been of existential importance in Germany, has 
reacted defensively to the ”planned economy“ – in other 
words, the complex formed by linking major industry and 
service providers with ministerial bureaucracy (the state). 
This has widened the conflict between public service provi-
sion (desolate infrastructure, education, housing, etc.) and 
private provision; as well as between public service provi-
sion and society/the population. Furthermore, a form of lib-
ertarian resistance is developing out of the middle of society 
and it is positioning itself against the ingrained coalition of 
bureaucracy, state power and expert cultures, as manifested 
in commissions, hearings, consulting agreements, reports 
and so on.
Third, the ruling party itself is faced with difficult adjust-
ment processes that sometimes lead to sudden changes in 
direction. The ”exit from the exit“ from nuclear power, the 
abolition of conscription, and later the introduction of gay 
marriage, quotas for women, a minimum wage and rent con-
trols are all examples. These represent bastions of traditional, 
value-bound German conservatism that have been brushed 
aside by the chancellor within just one legislative term; 
although this has caused great turmoil within the CDU/CSU, 
critics have remained largely voiceless. However, these poli-
cies clearly represent a necessary process of reform that the 
CDU/CSU must go through – they reflect essential changes 
in social attitudes, such as in family policy and gender equal-
ity.
The effect of these policy changes on the CDU/CSU is 
similar to the turnaround performed by the SPD in labour 
market policy in 2003. However, Angela Merkel is proving 
to be a politically shrewd manager, with a far superior level 
of adaptability than Gerhard Schröder, and this has a lot to 
do with her rather pragmatic relationship to power. Yet the 
losses caused by the friction within the CDU/CSU should 
not be underestimated – this will become particularly clear 
on the day after the election. For example, although the 
”conservative camp“ may be united in its rejection of the 
tax increases proposed by opposition parties, the planned 
expansion of the ”mother’s pension“ has, for example, been 
criticised by the Confederation of Employers’ Associations 
as “harmful to employment” and “irresponsible”.10
tHe strong stability of tHe systeM
Despite political upheaval, there is still a high level of confi-
dence in the current form of government. In West Germany 
in the 1960s, 74 per cent of respondents answered affirma-
tively to the question ”do you think the democracy we have in 
the Federal Republic is the best form of government?“ Since 
then, the number of people agreeing with this statement has 
fluctuated between 70 and 80 per cent. The lowest approval 
rating was in 2008 with 62 per cent, but in 2013 approval was 
back to 75 per cent in Germany as a whole.11 At the same 
time, it is clear that although new parties can successfully 
enter the political arena, and that they may even gain man-
dates in individual federal states, in general elections they 
have little chance of placing new topics on the agenda or 
gaining new parliamentary support for past issues.
If we examine the lines of conflict that determine the devel-
opment of the German party system, it is likely that in addi-
tion to the conflict over ”welfare state redistribution versus 
market freedom“ the conflict between libertarian and author-
itarian concepts and styles of government will continue to 
gain in strength. It is here, along this axis, that smaller parties 
have another task: that of sharpening these conflicts, while 
representing and providing a coherent and organised expres-
sion of other cultural and ideological perspectives and pat-
terns of behaviour. The Green Party, which is hardly bound by 
opinion polls, draws it strength from here. Similarly, the new 
party ”Alternative for Germany“ and the success of the Pirate 
Party fulfil this task, even if there are major problems with the 
political form the Pirate Party has assumed. In contrast, the 
Left Party represents the conflict between ”the poor and the 
rich“, but given the current strength of the German welfare 
state, the Left Party is finding it particularly difficult to expand 
its support.
The power political options provided by the German party 
system mean that the current coalition under Chancellor 
Merkel is likely to continue its authoritarian and market-ori-
ented path. Consequently, we can expect economic policy 
to be characterised by plan economics, and governance to 
reflect the political style of a presidential system. Joining 
a grand coalition under Merkel would change little in this 
regard; it would merely increase the new coalition’s orien-
tation towards a more social state. A coalition between the 
Green Party and the SPD would of course be a different 
option altogether. It would probably lead to a more libertar-
ian style of politics, the social welfare component would be 
stronger, and economic policy would likely combine plan 
economics with other developments based on productive 
power such as transport, agriculture, communication, food 
and clothing, and energy policy.
gerMany’s Position as a global aCtor 
(in eleCtion Manifestos)
The CDU/CSU and the FDP view themselves as the rep-
resentatives of German interests. Germany is doing well in 
Europe: it is a role model, an anchor of stability and an engine 
of growth. The CDU sees itself as the party that can guaran-
tee a continuation of this situation. As such, the party aims 
to let the voters decide whether Germany will continue to 
remain strong or whether its stability should be squandered 
by the ”wrong decisions“, such as the communitisation of 
debt through debt redemption funds and Eurobonds, as sup-
ported by the SPD, the Greens and the Left Party.
The CDU/CSU consider preserving Germany’s strong 
economy as providing the basis of “prosperity for all through 
opportunities for success and advancement for everyone.” 
This is to be achieved through a competitive society of oppor-
tunities. This approach, combined with the idea of “no ben-
efits without a return contribution” – whether in Germany or 
in the rest of Europe – pervades the policies of the CDU/CSU 
and the FDP, and it is clearly reflected in their election mani-
festos.
At the same time, the CDU/CSU are developing policies 
that on the one hand respond to the increasingly divergent 
interests present among CDU/CSU voters, and on the other 
hand react to the intensified discourse on deepening social 
4divisions and solidified poverty. These policies include full 
employment and a minimum wage, joint income tax assess-
ment for families, the mother’s pension and demands for 
affordable housing. Despite these developments, the imple-
mentation of these policies remains conditional on financing 
first being made available for them. Finally, these policies are 
aimed at mobilising the CDU/CSU voter base, while encour-
aging SPD and Green Party voters to stay at home.
Most important of all is the Euro Plus Pact. This is an agree-
ment between nation states and the European Commission 
that sets out specific measures aimed at eventually creating 
a North Atlantic Free Trade Area between Europe and the 
US. This would constitute the world’s largest economic area. 
Germany’s changing economic position within the EU and in 
global competition is leading the CDU/CSU to search for new 
export markets that are “no longer merely located on our 
doorstep, but also include the emerging markets of Asia and 
Latin America, Africa and the Arab world”,12 in other words 
markets that are increasingly outside of Europe. The FDP 
takes up a similar position in its policy to improve German 
exports through expansion “into emerging markets”.13
The SPD also emphasizes Germany’s special role and 
international responsibility, and even supports the proposed 
free trade agreement. However, in order to succeed interna-
tionally, the SPD argues that German industry needs to be 
secured by renewing traditional industries and opening up 
new leading markets, such as mobility, health, energy and 
infrastructure. “The country must ensure it keeps an edge 
over the international competition in the areas in which 
German industry is particularly strong.”14 
The Green Party links international competitiveness to the 
transition to low-resource production, closed-loop mate-
rial cycles and fair and comparable working conditions as 
a means of enabling small and medium-sized businesses 
to remain competitive. The party argues that, “Sustainabil-
ity must become the basis of European competitiveness.”15 
Although the Greens do not question the proposed free trade 
agreement, the party does at least insist on the Bundestag 
having a say in negotiations.
The Left Party, in contrast, argues that “no positive devel-
opments” will come of the free trade area. Instead, the party 
fears that it will lead to unrestricted importation of genetically 
engineered products, increased competition between large 
companies in the United States and Germany (at the expense 
of economically weaker EU countries), and public services 
becoming subject to unregulated world markets. The Left 
Party calls for a fundamentally different economic logic: one 
in which people are more important than banks, and a social 
alternative to finance-driven capitalism. It connects these 
policies with demands for a re-foundation of Europe. For 
this reason, the Left Party rejects the Stability and Fiscal Pact 
as well as the debt brake that has been adopted at all levels 
of government – and it is the only party in the Bundestag to 
do so. In contrast, the CDU/CSU, the FDP, the SPD and the 
Greens all view these measures as providing an essential 
basis for political action.
a bloC against MerKel?
The SPD has so far ruled out forming a coalition with the 
Left Party and the Greens. Nevertheless, the three parties 
have a number of similar – or even identical – policies, which 
are merely either weighted or defined differently, or formu-
lated more radically by the Left Party. However, this leads to 
a contradiction: to varying degrees the SPD and the Green 
Party have turned away from ”Agenda 2010“ and its neolib-
eral premises, but the parties have not drawn any practical 
conclusions from this in the policies they have put forward 
since the beginning of the euro crisis. Furthermore, these 
parties continue to assume that there is no shared basis 
with which to form a coalition with the Left Party. Moreo-
ver, although the Left Party restored its ability to act effec-
tively after gaining a new leadership, there is still no majority 
support in society for a change in political direction. Despite 
this, the similarities in approach between the SPD, the Green 
Party and the Left Party may well have consequences for the 
future; as such, their positions are considered briefly in the 
following.
All three parties call for the EU to be complemented by a 
social union, for control and reform of the banking sector, 
a European rating agency, a tax on financial transactions 
(the Left Party at 0.1 per cent) and Eurobonds. Whereas 
the Greens aim to anchor a clause for social progress in EU 
primary law, the Left Party focuses more on the definition 
and implementation of European social corridors as a means 
of bringing about equality in people’s standards of living.
The Green Party’s policy aims of replacing “unfettered 
capitalism” with “regulation of the financial markets” and 
“growth” with “real quality of life” are certainly goals that 
are supported by both the social democrats and the Left 
Party. The same applies to the Greens’ call for a statutory 
minimum wage (SPD and the Green Party: € 8.50, the Left 
Party: € 10, rising to € 12 after 2017), generally-binding 
collective agreements, measures against wage dumping 
in temporary and contract work, citizens’ insurance, sus-
tainable production, the continuation of the energy transi-
tion, affordable electricity and affordable housing through 
rent limits. Unlike the SPD and the Greens, however, the 
Left Party also calls for the abolition of the Hartz IV social 
security laws. Despite this, tax policy offers a further pos-
sible basis for agreement: the Left Party argues that the top 
rate of tax should be increased to 53 %, while the SPD and 
the Greens support 49 %. Whereas the Left Party aims to 
revert the increase in retirement age (which is due to be 
increased to 67), the SPD seeks to postpone its introduction, 
and the Greens argue for a gradual increase of retirement 
age. At the same time, the SPD and Greens are calling for a 
minimum pension of € 850, whereas the Left Party supports 
a minimum pension of € 1,050.
European and foreign policy constitutes the largest differ-
ence between the Left Party and all other parties represented 
in the Bundestag. Although the Left Party is not calling for 
an end to the euro, the party views the euro’s continued 
existence as essentially linked to an end of austerity. The Left 
Party rejects the Fiscal Pact and the Troika’s memoranda, and 
opposes involving the Bundeswehr in combat operations, 
reforming the army into a modern operational force, and 
establishing a European armaments agency. Furthermore, 
the Left Party refuses to participate in governments that 
wage war or permit the Bundeswehr to engage in foreign 
combat missions.
It is still unclear which course the European crisis will take. 
The current climate of relative stability could quickly col-
lapse. Whether such a situation could provide the chance for 
a real break with neoliberalism is questionable in the context 
of the current general election. As long as they can, the gov-
erning parties will continue their policies of crisis corporat-
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ism. Importantly, there is clear majority support for this path 
among the elites and even among the opinions voiced by the 
population. However, intensified competition and continued 
austerity policies are deepening the causes of the crisis. This 
is the best argument against leaving things the way they are. 
Consequently, it is time the Left properly prepared itself for 
this difficult situation.
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